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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN
AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORMS IN ZAMBIA 
C. Muntanga and F. Mwiinga
BACKGROUND
The real output of the Zambian economy has been declining 
for the last decade. Various factors have contributed to
this prolonged contraction including:
1. The heavy import dependency of the existing economic
structure. The productive structure in the economy 
depends on imports for raw materials and essential 
production inputs like oil, fertilizers, pesticides and 
other agricultural and industrial chemicals. In
addition, the production structure in the parastatal 
sector is strongly biased -towards the production of 
consumer commodities rather than intermediate goods. 
This lop-sided development of the manufacturing sector 
with its import dependency is exacerbated by the 
shortage of foreign exchange over the past decade. 
These problems have led to the under-utilization of 
capacity in most industries and have inhibited the 
smooth operation of the manufacturing sector, whose 
output is subject to wide fluctuations depending on the 
availability of imported inputs.
2. The export sector has not been sufficiently diversified 
despite the fact that this has been one of the major 
objectives of all the three medium-term plans that the 
country has so far implemented. Over 90 percent of 
export earnings are still derived from mineral exports 
of which copper is the dominant commodity. The copper 
mining industry is itself highly dependent on imports 
and absorbs almost a third of the foreign exchange 
earnings for imported inputs.
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3. Sharp deterioration in Zambia's terms of trade during 
the last decade; has greatly reduced Zambia's capacity 
to import. The result is that investment in the 
domestic economy has fallen sharply from 22 percent of 
real GDP in 1980 to 11 percent in 1985. The bv-'lj^of
this investment expenditure is directed towards the 
rehabilitation of the existing industries, structures 
and institutions. There is very little investment in 
diversification of the domestic economy.
4. The deterioriation in Zambia's balance of payments 
position worsened in 1982 and led the country to
suspend external debt service payments. In early 1983, 
the country had to go to the Paris Club to ask for 
re-scheduling of some of its debt service liabilities. 
The process has since been repeated for the third 
successive year in 1985.
5. Agricultural output remains heavily dependent on
rain-fed cultivation. Hence, a shortfall in food
production is always experienced when there is a 
drought and the country has to import food, especially 
maize, to meet its requirements. Buffer stocks are not 
available to shield the nation against adverse weather 
conditions. Other problems in this sector include: 
lack of regionally self-sufficient agricultural 
processing facilities and capacity at provincial and 
district levels, to process agricultural raw materials 
such as leather, oil seeds, wood etc. to produce
finished goods.
6. The interaction of the various factors outlined above 
has contributed to Zambia's current economic crisis and 
to its external indebtedness. There is an urgent need 
to restructure the economy.
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AGRICULTURAL REFORMS
Agricultural Pricing Policy
Zambia's agricultural pricing policy has been focused on 
price stabilization to ensure that farmers recover^ their 
production costs when their produce is sold. The
government uses a cost of production method in determining 
crop producer prices and producer prices are reviewed 
annually to reflect inflation and other changes in the 
economy.
In 1984 thp government introduced floor prices for all 
controlled agricultural commodities except maize. Under 
the floor price regime, the farmer is free to negotiate for 
a price higher than the government set price. This move is
an attempt to bring the crop producer prices in line with
the decontrolled prices of their end products. Prior to
the introduction of the floor prices, there was an outcry
by the farming community that government controls on 
producer prices were taxing farmers in the sense that the 
crop prices were artificially depressed. This was viewed
as a disincentive to investment in the agricultural sector. 
This outcry won sympathy from the government and a floor
price scheme was adopted to ensure reasonable returns to
farmers irrespective of the prevailing market situation.
In this way, capital flows into agriculture would continue 
thereby enhancing overall agricultural development.
Although the floor price system is in effect, most crops
have not benefitted from this policy decision. The floor
price in most cases has remained "the selling price". This 
is principally due to lack of a strong organisation to 
fight for high prices on behalf of the farmers
particularly small scale farmers. However, crops such as 
wheat, soyabeans and tobacco that are dominated by 
commercial farmers have been able to realize higher prices 
through their organization - the Commercial Farmers Bureau.
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Liberalization of the Agricultural Marketing
Since 1968, the National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAM 
Board) was the only organization with statutory power to 
market agricultural crops except specialized crops such as 
cotton, tobacco, tea and coffee. It also wSk**' the
responsibility of importing any shortfalls and/or exporting 
any surplus. However, NAMBoard's performance has never 
been very satisfactory. It could not reach some of the 
areas thereby denying farmers in such areas access to the 
formal market. It could not move all the crops to safe 
storage on time to avoid losses through rains. It was 
generally highly inefficient and depended on government 
subsidy for their day-to-day operations.
In 1982, the government allowed provincial co-operative 
unions to market agricultural crops in their respective 
provinces. NAMBoard's operations were restricted to inter­
provincial marketing of maize and exporting any surplus 
and/or importing any shortfall. Under this new
arrangement, the situation seemed to worsen and subsidies 
to NAMBoard and Provincial Unions more than doubled.
In 1985, the government made another attempt to try to 
improve the marketing situation. This time, instead of 
allowing NAMBoard and Co-operative Unions operating 
independently, they had to work with Unions acting as 
agents of NAMBoard in the marketing of maize. However, 
Unions retained the portfolio of marketing other crops such 
as sunflowers, groundnuts, soyabeans, cassava, sorghum 
millet, etc. This new arrangement also did not solve the 
marketing problems. Apparently, Unions did not accept this 
arrangement and as a result, they never took the
responsibility seriously. The whole arrangement ended up 
as a total failure. It was, however, believed that no one 
instituion had the capacity to effectively market maize 
throughout the country.
In view of the problems outlined above, in April of 1986 
the government passed a policy decision to liberalise the 
marketing of crops which were marketed by NAMBoard. Under 
this new arrangement, NAMBoard ceased to enjoy statutory 
monopooly power in the marketing of agricultural- ^  crops 
especially maize. Today all interested parties including 
NAMBoard, Unions, Millers and indeed private traders are 
free to participate in the marketing of agricultural crops. 
However, NAMBoard is charged with the following responsibil­
ity for maize:
(1) the buyer of last resort,
i
(2) importing and exporting maize,
(3) maintaining a strategic reserve of 2.5 million 
90kg bags at all time, and
(4) facilitating inter-provincial trade i.e. supplying 
maize to deficit provinces from surplus provinces.
Moreover, NAMBoard has to compete with provincial unions, 
millers and other private traders in the marketing of maize 
in surplus provinces.
It is hoped that under the new marketing arrangement, a 
more efficient marketing system will emerge.
It is assumed that allowing wider participation in the 
trade, competition will emerge among participating 
institutions/persons thereby promoting efficiency. More 
importantly is the belief that by freeing the marketing 
system all parts of the country will be serviced. Also by 
allowing direct sales of maize to millers by farmers both 
the transport and handling costs will be reduced.
Though it is too early to assess the performance of the new 
marketing arrangement, it is probably worthwhile to note 
that the marketing of maize in 1986 has been much better 
co-ordinated than the previous years. Payment to farmers 
for their produce has been fairly prompt and also almost 90
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percent of the marketed maize has already been moved to 
safe storage. This is not to say that the new system has 
no problems. To the contrary, the system experienced some 
operational problems initially.
NAMBoard could not supply empty grain bags to Unions on 
credit as has been the tradition. This is because they 
were no longer associates but competitors. This caused con­
siderable delays in the distribtuion of empty grain bags 
particularly in the remote areas where NAMBoard has no dis­
tributional outlets. Also, because the government had to 
pay a maize subsity to NAMBoard and Unions and not to other 
potential * traders, the marketing activity remained restrict­
ed to NAMBoard and Unions. This problem has however, been 
resolved by ensuring that subsidy is only paid to Millers 
on the basis of their mealie meal production figures. This 
means that agricultural marketing institutions will not re­
ceive subsidy, instead they will charge economic prices for 
maize sold to millers. It is hoped that this arrangement 
will permit all interested parties to participate in the 
marketing of maize. And indeed, any other agricultural com­
modity.
Input Procurement and Distribution
The government has also made some policy changes with re­
gard to the procurement and distribtuion of inputs particu­
larly fertilizer and grain bags. The procurement and distri­
bution of other inputs has aleady been decontrolled.
Under the new policy measure, NAMBoard will no longer be ob­
ligated to procure and distribute these inputs. Instead, it 
will compete with other interested traders. The idea is to 
spread the financial burden of procuring fertilizer and 
empty grain bags. It was also felt that those farmers or 
group of farmers should be allowed to import inputs instead 
of waiting for NAMBoard fertilizer which, in most cases, is 
either in short supply or distributed late.
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Incentives
The government has also introduced the following incentives 
to enhace agricultural development:
(i) attractive producer prices, •
(ii) a flat tax rate of 15 percent on income from
agriculture,
(iii) development allowance for growers of tea, coffee 
and citrus fruits,
(iv) two years write-off period for farm machinery and 
equipment,
(v) withdraw of selective employment tax on incomes 
of expatriates engaged in agriculture,
(vi) exemption of customs duty on imported
agricultural machinery,
(vii) foreign exchange retention scheme for exporters 
of agricultural commodities.
RESEARCH AND EXTENSION
A recognised critical input in the development of agricul­
ture is the supply of the appropriate messages from 
research extension.
The Department of Agriculture has re-organised its research 
department where research has historically been carried out 
by disciplines. Under the new system research is carried 
out by Commodity Research Teams (CRT), Specialist Research 
Teams (SRT) and Adaptive Research Planning Teams (ARPT). 
Commodity Research Teams conduct applied agricultural 
research on a given commodity in order to generate new tech­
nology and build up a pool of knowledge (and expertise) on 
that commodity. Specialist Research Teams focus on the pro­
duction and constraints of a given locality or farming 
system drawing on the pool of knowledge by the respective 
Commodity and Specialist Teams. The Adaptive Research 
Planning Teams are charged with developing a two way com­
munication link between the Commodity and Specialist 
Research Team and the farmers or specific target groups 
with the involvement of extension staff at all levels.
Formal links between Research and Extension exist through
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various committees such as annual commodity research 
meetings which are attended by Extension Subject Matter 
Specialists. Besides these annual meetings, there are also 
a number of co-ordination meetings. The establishment of 
the post of Research-Extension Liaison Officer at "“‘-the 
Headquarters of Agricultural Research and in all Adaptive 
Research Planning Teams based at the provincial level is 
aimed at strengthening this linkage and getting information 
following between the branches and farmers.
The Extension Services has also re-orientated its approach 
towards technology transfer. In the past progressive 
farmers were given priority. Now it is obliged to serve 
all types of farmers. However, due to the limited 
resources (both in terms of staff and infrastructure) 
emphasis is now directed towards the small scale grower 
because these are the majority of the farming population 
and lag behind in improved knowledge and technolgy. 
Because of this emphasis, the Department of Agriculture 
decided to introduce an intensive method of extension 
popularly known as the Training and Visit System (the T and 
V System). The Extension Branch has since been
restructured, especially at the lower levels, in order to 
implement this new extension approach. Basically, the T 
and V System involves regular scheduled visits to contact 
farmer or farmer groups on pre-arranged days. These visits 
are also extended to the field staff group discussion, 
mobile courses, and demonstrations. Regular supervisory 
visits are made by senior staff to assist in solving 
farmers' problems and conducting courses or demonstrations.
CONCLUSION
All these reform measures mentioned above are intended to 
enhance the development of the agricultural sector. There 
is a firm conviction that given Zambia's endowments and 
level of technological development, the only logical path 
to a meaningful development is to start with agriculture.
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